(author's note: written a year before these events transpired...and how little things have changed...)

The concept of the six month revolving EU Council Presidency has shown that Europe is in serious in need of strong leadership. The act of constantly swapping the person in charge every half-year takes a serious toll on the smooth functioning of this bloc. It's the equivalent to building a slew of foundations all over the place, then leaving them partially finished. Rotation is quixotic and capricious, and it's no way to run the twenty-seven Member States' affairs.

It has taken some time for the concept of the EU being run by smaller post-Communist states to take root. Slovenia, as of this writing, has been the only former Bloc country which has succeeded in helming Europe -- sandwiched, as was, between the more capable Portuguese and French Presidencies -- so as to ensure the emerging democracy wouldn't go astray.

For now, this is the trust which the larger European powers have entrusted to their junior partners in the Union, not content to permit them to run free without chaperoning. But the net effect has been like riding a horse with blinders. Western Europe remains unsure of these lesser former Bloc powers, almost as if they are saying that one impetuous decision taken absent of the Greater Powers' guidance will spell doom for the entire Union.

Surely, one can see the logic in this from the perspective of nations like France, the UK, Germany, and Spain. Handing off the reins of power to Slovenia or -- in 2009 -- the Czech Republic could have tremendous ramifications for continental immigration policy. A nation, say, like France, with an atrocious record in dealing with its migrants, or, say, Germany, a state with a complicated relationship vis-a-vis its newcomers as well, will hardly be as forthcoming in remedying these domestic problems through a radical pan-EU approach to immigration law.

But a smaller nation like, say, Slovenia would have greater incentive to introduce radical migration policy as a way of making waves as a small player in a much larger body where it cannot possibly hope to make much of an impact. Since it only has one way of standing out, through its policy directives, this would appear to be its most successful strategy.

Plaguing the rotating European Presidency is also its inherent design faults. The way it's currently set up is that smaller, more intrepid, nations aren't currently permitted to retain the Council Presidency twice consecutively. For instance, the Czech Republic is part of a "troika," whereby it will be hemmed in between both France before and Sweden immediately after. It's a tacit signal larger Member States convey to the newer joiners: "The benefits of Membership are yours to enjoy, but leave the complex governing of the Union to the big boys, will ya?"

The Troika System is yet another of those silent signals by large states to small that the potential introduction of a controversial law which wealthier members don't unanimously support can be duly reversed during a subsequent Presidency. Policies promoted by the smaller Council Presidency states (egs. Slovenia, the Czech Republic) that are contrary to the interests of the larger members, who stand to lose a great deal more from the introduction of radical policies than the smaller nations, will likely be overturned. In essence, the larger members act like bullies, ganging up on the smaller members.

Since there's no track record for how something like this should transpire, expect to see several such reversals at the conclusion of the Czech Council Presidency, a half-year period which will be dominated for the most part by euroscepticism and contrariness on direct orders from Prague Castle.

(excerpted from A SAD AND TRAGIC TALE OF MISTER DOUH, by Adam Daniel Mezei)